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LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
Robert Mundheim: In any event, if the freeze was not recog-
nized, the banks were still prepared to argue their setoffs in the British
courts, the French courts, and the German courts.
Cynthia Lichenstein: I think I can help clarify. When speaking
about attachments of deposits you are dealing with property of the
attachment debtor, which is Iran, in the hands of a third party, the
bank, and the question is, what is the situs of the property? Thus, the
banks can argue for purposes of not recognizing an attachment which
was issued by a New York court that the situs of the debt owed (i.e.,
the deposit account) by Citibank's French office or its London branch
is in France or in England and that the property right was in England
or in France for that purpose. Simultaneously, they can argue that the
U.S. Government freeze order should be given effect by the foreign
court insofar as their obligation to repay Iran is concerned because the
parties to the deposit agreement have determined that New York law
should be applicable or because ultimately the transfer will have to
take place on the books in New York. These are two totally separate
arguments. So they can happily reply "No Funds;" there are no funds
booked here in the United States.
Robert Mundheim: I'm reassured.
THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS THROUGH ARBITRATION
Alan Swan: I think what we shall do now is go back to Mark
Feldman for some comments regarding the development of the arbi-
tral tribunal1 4 as one way of resolving the claims problem.
Mark Feldman: Just for purposes of structuring some of the
presentation, I will try to talk about the arbitration process itself.
Much of this has yet to unfold and I can really use such advice as you
may want to give to me. We are just feeling our way. Later on we can
talk about the domestic litigation implications of these agreements.
One thing I would like to say by way of background is that from
the outset of the negotiations, when the Iranians called for the return
of their assets, the U.S. Government took the position that because of
the judicial attachments we could not return those assets without
Iran's agreement to an effective claims settlement process.
The Iranians first floated the idea of arbitration. I cannot say
exactly how it came up in the negotiations with the Algerians because
I was not involved intimately in the early stages of it. But there had
14. This tribunal is established by the Claims Settlement Agreement supra note
1, at art. II.
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been public references to arbitration by Nabavi 5 among others. From
the very early period, the Iranians said two things, (1) that they
would pay their debts, and (2) that they would be prepared to have
the claims settled by a process in which the United States appointed
one person, Iran appointed one person, and those two appointed a
third. It was that kind of three-man proposal that was the background
against which we prepared the Claims Settlement Agreement. The
only other major option was a lump-sum settlement agreement; a
collective settlement of all of the claims for cash or for cash over a
period of years-probably in this case for cash on the barrelhead-
with claims later to be adjudicated by the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission. ' We had a lot of discussion and vacillation in our own
ranks as to which was the better procedure. The advantage of a
lump-sum settlement is that it gets the money up front. You know
how much you have; there is certainty, speed, and so forth. The
disadvantage is that the settlement is likely to come in at substantially
less than one hundred cents on the dollar. At least that is the experi-
ence with such settlements. We could not be sanguine about being
able to get an amount of money from Iran that would satisfy all of the
claimants through that kind of process.
The advantage of the arbitration process to the United States is
Iran's acceptance of liability for one hundred cents on the dollar for
all the claims determined to be valid by an impartial decision maker.
Moreover, we were able to get a fund of $1 billion to secure that
liability. 17 Even though that fund is probably not, in itself, adequate
to pay one hundred cents on the dollar for all claims, it is a substantial
amount of money.
15. Behzad Nabavi, member of the Iranian cabinet with the rank of Minister of
State for Executive Affairs, chairman and principal negotiator of the Iranian Com-
mission that negotiated the hostage settlement.
16. This commission was established in 1950 pursuant to the International
Claims Settlement Act of 1949, ch. 54, 64, Stat. 12 [current version at 22 U.S.C.
.§§ 1621-1644 (1977)].
17. Algerian Declaration, supra note 1, at par. 7 provides:
As funds received by the Central Bank pursuant to Paragraph 6
above, the Algerian Central Bank shall direct the Central Bank to (1)
transfer one-half of each such receipt to Iran and (2) place the other half in
a special interest-bearing security account in the Central Bank, until the
balance in the security account has reached the level of $1 billion. After
the $1 billion balance has been achieved, the Algerian Central Bank shall
direct all funds received pursuant to Paragraph 6 to be transferred to Iran.
All funds in the security account are to be used for the sole purpose of
securing the payment of, and paying, claims against Iran in accordance
with the claims settlement agreement. Whenever the Central Bank shall
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From the beginning, it was clear that Iran would not accept
judgments made by U.S. courts. They stated that position very
clearly. I am not quite sure exactly how the subject was first broached
in the negotiations with the Algerians. But sometime, at least by
December, the United States provided Iran with four or five points
that were necessary if the United States were to make any kind of
settlement with them. The claims issue was one of these. It was part of
our fundamental negotiating position from the beginning. We had
several objectives: getting our people out, ending the crisis which had
complicated our strategic interests in that area of the world, and
establishing an effective claims settlement process. We achieved all
three of those objectives.
Now, we did not get beyond the four or five general points,
which included arbitration, until the holiday season-in late Decen-
ber, almost New Year's Day-when the United States first tabled a
draft agreement. We had prepared a twenty-three page draft arbitra-
tion agreement which covered all the things that we could think of in
elaborate detail the way a lawyer would like to have it done. But,
when we came down to the crisis negotiations, it became apparent
that that was much more than the traffic would bear, particularly in
this kind of indirect negotiation with people who do not understand
anything about legal process, so we went back to work and prepared
an eight-page document that was handed to the Algerians. They came
back and said, "The text was too complicated. Couldn't we do it in
one page?" They said that if they took it to Tehran it would take six
months for the Iranians to study it and get agreement on it. We
responded that we had to have a legally effective agreement and it just
could not be compressed very much. We stood firm, although we did
compress it some. For example, we had used the typical definitions of
a claim found in U.S. claims agreements. We were persuaded that the
definitions could be simplified so they could be digested in Tehran
without losing any significant legal protection. In a few other places it
was simplified and digested to five or six pages and sent off to Tehran.
thereafter notify Iran that the balance in the security account has fallen
below $500 million, Iran shall promptly make new deposits sufficient to
maintain a minimum balance of $500 million in the account. The account
shall be so maintained until the President of the Arbitral Tribunal estab-
lished pursuant to the claims settlement agreement has certified to the
Central Bank of Algeria that all arbitral awards against Iran have been
satisfied in accordance with the claims settlement agreement, at which
point any amount remaining in the security account shall be transferred to
Iran.
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The issue that caused the Algerians the greatest difficulty, and
caused us the greatest discussion in the Washington round of negotia-
tions, related to the definition of national claims. It was their view
that Iran had agreed to negotiate the claims of U.S. nationals, ' 8 that
foreign corporations did not qualify as U.S. nationals, and that there
should be no coverage of the claims of U.S. shareholders in foreign
corporations. We had originally proposed that an indirect interest or
indirect claim of a minority share-holder of U.S. nationality could be
brought if collectively the U.S. share-holders held twenty-five percent
of the stock of the foreign corporation. We could not sell that, so we
agreed on a draft that substituted the concept of control. 9 We
understand that it will be up to the tribunal to decide what that
means. But it is distinctly not a percentage of ownership; we got away
from that test. I think it is up to the claimants who find themselves in
that position to argue that control is a matter to be decided by the
tribunal based not only upon their shareholdings in relation to the
dispersion of the rest of the stock, but also upon management con-
tracts and other relevant contractual relationships. This has become a
matter of concern, and those concerns have found voice in the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee where I was asked to address the ques-
tion on March 4. This is the kind of answer that I gave to that
question.
Michael Silverman: Was there any discussion of the issue of
minority U.S. interests in Iranian ventures?
18. A "national" is defined in the Claims Settlement Agreement as follows:
1. A "national of Iran or of the United States, as the case may be,
means (a) a natural person who is a citizen of Iran or the United States;
and (b) a corporation or other legal entity which is organized under the
laws of Iran or the United States or any of its states or territories, the
District of Columbia or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, if, collec-
tively, natural persons who are citizens of such country hold, directly or
indirectly, an interest in such corporation or entity equivalent to fifty
percent or more of its capital stock.
Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 1, at art. VII.
19. 2. "Claims of nationals" of Iran or the United States, as the case may be,
means claims owned continuously, from the date on which the claim arose to the
date on which this agreement enters into force, by nationals of that state, including
claims that are owned indirectly by such nationals through ownership of capital stock
or other proprietary interests in juridical persons, provided that the ownership inter-
ests of such nationals, collectively, were sufficient at the time the claim arose to
control the corporation or other entity, and provided, further, that the corporation
or other entity is not itself entitled to bring a claim under the terms of this agreement.
Claims referred to the Arbitral Tribunal shall, as of the date of filing of such claims
with the Tribunal, be considered excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts of Iran,
or of the United States, or of any other court.
Id.
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Mark Feldman: Well, the Algerians were thinking primarily of
European companies in which Americans might have casual shares.
That was the example they gave of situations that should not be
covered. We pointed out that probably the most important situation
affected by this provision was that of an Iranian corporation having
significant minority U.S. shareholders. With that in mind they
seemed willing, nonetheless, to accept the concept of control.
Michael Silverman: Am I correct when I read the language as
permitting American nationals who own a claim continuously in Iran
to bring that claim before the tribunal even if they have a minority
interest in an Iranian venture, so long as they have control?
Mark Feldman: There are two aspects to this. If the shares are
taken, then you have a direct claim.
Michael Silverman: Regardless of minority or majority?
Mark Feldman: Right. And there may be other circumstances in
which you can argue a direct claim. But if you are really talking about
an indirect claim because of the taking of a foreign corporation,
Iranian or otherwise, then to qualify for the tribunal there has to be
"control," but collective control. In other words, the individual claim-
ant does not have to show that he has control, only that U.S. nationals
collectively have control. Now, we knew that some companies are
fifty-fifty. We just do not know how that is going to work out; it will
have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. We had in mind the fact
that under SEC 20 and other practice in the United States, ten percent
or fifteen percent can sometimes control or, I suppose, in an enormous
corporation one or two percent can control if the shares are suffi-
ciently dispersed. And, of course, depending upon who makes up the
tribunal, there may be a problem of educating the tribunal of these
kinds of questions.
Michael Silverman: In the case of a taking, was the required
"control" intended to be control at the time of taking?
Mark Feldman: Yes, the Agreements so specify. 2'
Robert Mundheim: If you have a corporation with sixty percent
non-U.S. ownership including one forty percent Iranian owner, and
forty percent U.S. ownership, under SEC concepts both of the latter
might be considered to be in control, particularly if they have run the
corporation together. How would that come out in your view under
this agreement?
20. Securities and Exchange Commission.
21. Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 1, at art. VIII, para. 2.
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Mark Feldman: I would hope that we would have the broadest
jurisdiction.
Robert Mundheim: But you haven't given them a lesson in SEC
concepts of control?
Mark Feldman: I do not think I was qualified to do that.
Stefan Riesenjeld: We might ask how "control" is determined as
a matter of the conflict of laws.
Mark Feldman: Let's raise that question, I would like to learn
the answer. My first reaction is to ask why the issue even arises.
Michael Reisman: The UNCITRAL rules. 22
Mark Feldman: Well, the UNCITRAL rules do not provide for
substantive law.
Michael Reisman: That is a choice of law problem.
Mark Feldman: There is a difference between the law which
applies to the contract dispute-that is for the tribunal-and the law
governing the claims settlement agreement itself. That is international
law, isn't it? And that is what we are talking about.
Stefan Riesenfeld: Yes, but international law might say that
insofar as American companies are concerned "control" is to be deter-
mined by American law, while "control" of Iranian companies is to be
determined by Iranian law. You do not know whether international
law has its own standard or whether it refers to local law. You will
have to investigate that issue with care. It may well be that interna-
tional law has a built-in concept of "control" or it may provide that
insofar as interests in national companies are concerned "control" is to
be determined by local law. The applicable rule of international law
may have the character of a conflicts rule or it may contain a concept
of its own distilled from comparative analysis.
Mark Feldman: I would have thought that the only thing at
issue here is the intent of the parties, which are two sovereign states,
to the agreement.
Stefan Riesenfeld: Yes, but the intention may be that these
rules should control. I am thinking about the reference to the SEC. I
22. UNCITRAL-United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, U.N.P. Sales No. E.77.V.6, reprinted in 1 C.
SCHMITTHOFF, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 181 (1980) [for the text of
the rules, see infra Appendix at 212]. The Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note
1, at art. III, para. 2, provides that the arbitral tribunal "shall conduct its business in
accordance with" these rules.
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am just uneasy. Frankly, I am puzzled that people talk about the SEC
in connection with Iranian companies. It just goes somewhat against
my legal instincts.
Robert Mundheim: Don't take the question too literally. I just
wanted to raise the principle.
Michael Reisman: A point of information: if this aspect of the
problem is governed by international law, you must look to the Inter-
national Court of Justice's judgment in Barcelona Traction.2 3 It devi-
ates very sharply in this regard from U.S. practice.
Mark Feldman: But the parties didn't adopt the rule in Barce-
lona Traction. The agreement is expressly to the contrary.
Michael Reisman: But you said international law governs the
issue of who is entitled to protection under the agreement. Interna-
tional law on this point is expressed in Barcelona Traction.
Mark Feldman: What is international law? The intent of the
parties to the agreement and nothing more. It is an exercise in com-
mon sense. It requires the right kind of tribunal trying to do justice in
a very complicated situation by taking into account the business ex-
pectations of the parties, the nature of the injury, and the purposes of
the agreement.24
Hans Smit: Of course, article 24 does address this question in
circular fashion. When I read this, I smiled and asked whether that
was drafted by someone who had ever sat on an arbitral tribunal.
Having had that privilege and having had the privilege of operating
under applicable law clauses, I think it is fair to say that, in all the
cases in which I have sat, we said, "Well, who cares about the applica-
ble law clause? We are making up the law we think is appropriate for
the case at hand." I remember writing an opinion in which I said we
had to consider whether international law is applicable or interna-
tional commercial law or the law of Belgium or the law of Delaware
or the law of Wisconsin, all of which had some connection with the
subject at hand. Since we wanted to make the award judgment-proof,
I said that under all of these laws the consequence was the same. The
23. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd
(Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase [1970] I.C.J. 3 [hereinafter Barcelona Traction].
24. Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 1, at art. V provides:
The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for law,
applying such choice of law rules and principles of commercial and inter-
national law as the Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking into
account relevant usages of the trade, contract provisions and changed
circumstances.
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fact, of course, was that we asked, "What are the reasonable rules to
be applied to this situation?" In fact, this is the first time that I have
ever seen an agreement that tells the tribunal to determine the rules
that it thinks should be applicable. You often find clauses which refer
to such things as international law in the light of reason and justice and
equity, but this is the first time I have seen the arbitrators told to go
and do right. Now, of course, you may have also opened a Pandora's
box. In a normal arbitral tribunal the arbitrators might get together
and come to some sensible solution. In this particular tribunal, with
the Iranians naming one-third, a lot of problems are going to have to
be resolved before you come to some kind of consensus as to what the
law might be.
Michael Reisman: I wanted to pursue something Mark Feld-
man said. It is self-delusion to assume that because the judges are
reasonable or, at least, that two of the three judges are reasonable,
they will apply the agreement the way we understand it. The major-
ity of the judges in the Barcelona Traction case were reasonable, a
majority of them were European, but they said, as a general matter,
that it is only the state of registration of a corporation that can bring a
claim on its behalf. It seems to me that the situation we face here is
even more problematic. If you are saying that the agreement simply
invokes reason, you had better be sure that the calculus of reason that
the judges use does not follow Barcelona Traction.
Mark Feldman: First of all, I was not saying that article V25
was relevant to the issue. Someone else said that. Article V, as I
understand it, deals with the question of the law to -be applied by the
tribunal in deciding specific cases.
Hans Smit: That is no way to say it.
Mark Feldman: "[The Tribunal] shall decide all cases . ;26
that is, article V refers to the law applicable in the decision of the
particular cases. It does not apply to the law of the agreement itself.
There is no law of any nation that is applicable to this agreement.
This is an agreement between two sovereign states, so questions con-
cerning the tribunal's jurisdiction, and so forth, will not be decided
according to national law.
Stefan Riesenfeld: Why do you have the words "choice of law"
written there [in the Agreement], when you say that they were not
meant to be in there?
25. Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 1, at art. V.
26. Id.
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Mark Feldman: I did not say they were not meant to be in
there.
Stejan Riesenfeld: Then let me rephrase the issue a little bit.
We are discussing the interrelationship of article VII(2) and article V
of the Claims Settlement Agreement. We are discussing the question
whether the "control" of an Iranian company was to be determined
by Iranian law and of an American company by American law or
whether in all cases this question was to be determined according to
general principles. That is the question; what do those words mean? Is
article VII(2) to be interpreted in light of article V or not? Of course,
the arbitrators will do what is good but then we must ask what is
good? Somebody has to make the argument based on the agreement.
To me-I do not think that Mark Feldman disagrees with me-there
is some question as to how articles VII(2) and V interrelate insofar as a
determination of "control" is concerned. That is all I mean to say. The
record should show that I am not focusing on anything else. I still
think it is a reasonable question and probably a reasonable arbitrator
in a reasonable forum will follow my reasonable suggestion.
Robert Mundheim: And being eminently reasonable he proba-
bly would not look at the SEC rules.
Soia Mentschikoff: The language is very unique here. Hans
Smit is absolutely right. Look what it says: "The Tribunal shall decide
all cases on the basis of respect for law, applying such .. .rules and
principles of commercial and international law as the Tribunal deter-
mines to be applicable, taking into account relevant usages of the
trade, contract provisions, and changed circumstances. '2 7 This is not
a normal conflicts provision; it is not a normal arbitration provision.
Stefan Riesenjeld: You conveniently dropped part of the sen-
tence [referring to "choice of law" rules].
Mark Feldman: If you let me, I will tell you what it is. I myself
think this is one of the most interesting provisions of the agreement.
To give you background, the provision is there for a couple of differ-
ent reasons. First of all, the choice of law provisions in the UNCI-
TRAL rules do not mention international law. We were very much
concerned about the expropriation cases. Secondly, many of the con-
fracts-I do not know the exact percentage but it is large-are, ac-
cording to their terms, governed by Iranian law. Many of them
provide for arbitration under Iranian law, some ten or fifteen percent
27. id.
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provide for the resolution of disputes exclusively in the courts of Iran.
The purpose of this clause was to try to present something that was
sufficiently neutral and familiar, redolent of general principles of law
and equity, to permit the tribunal to do exactly what Hans Smit was
suggesting; that is, to override all the choice of law provisions in the
contracts and to do something that made sense. We introduced not
only international law but also general principles of commercial law.
I do not know whether there is a commercial law in Iran today, so we
allow the tribunal to make it up as it goes along.
The most controversial provision here relates to "changed cir-
cumstances." 28  The U.S. introduced that. All the U.S. drafts con-
tained it. It was not changed by Iran but was revised several times in
meetings with the Algerians, who wanted to get it shorter and sim-
pler. It lost a little precision in the process. The basic concept is all
ours; it constituted our major attempt to draw upon the revolutionary
circumstances in Iran in order to write contract commitments to the
Iranian courts out of the arbitration. This last, of course, is a whole
other issue to which we will want to come in a moment. The Iranian
courts provision in article 11(1) of the Claims Settlement Agreement 2
has a long history. But, on this reference to "changed circumstances,"
I think it gives the tribunal ample latitude to do justice in the circum-
stances and that was our objective.
Robert Mundheim: Mark, just to be clear, it is very important
to establish that article V does govern the question of jurisdiction
because that is the reason you wrote the "changed circumstances"
provision in there. In other words, with respect to some of the con-
28. Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 1, at art. V.
29. This article provides:
1. An International Arbitral Tribunal (the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal) is hereby established for the purpose of deciding claims of
nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran
against the United States, and any counterclaim which arises out of the
same contract, transaction or occurrence that constitutes the subject mat-
ter of that national's claim, if such claims and counterclaims are outstand-
ing on the date this agreement, whether or not filed with any court, and
arises out of debts, contracts (including transactions which are the subject
of letters of credit or bank guarantees), expropriations or other measures
affecting property rights, excluding claims described in Paragraph 11 of
the Declaration of the Government of Algeria of Jan. 19, 1981, and claims
arising out of the actions of the United States in response to the conduct
described in such paragraph, and excluding claims arising under a binding
contract between the parties specifically providing that any disputes
thereunder shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the competent Iranian
courts in response to the Majlis position.
Supra note 1.
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tracts under which disputes are to be tried exclusively in the courts of
Iran, this provision would give the tribunal the option of saying that,
in light of changed circumstances, those cases were properly before it.
Was that the purpose?
Mark Feldman: Yes. The "changed circumstance" language
came first. Then came the Majlis action putting in the language of
article II(1) of the Claims Settlement Agreement which withdraws
contracts referring disputes to the Iran courts from the jurisdiction of
the tribunal. Maybe I should just go into this because it all seems to be
part of one discussion.
The Algerians were very concerned about this from an early
date. The issue had arisen on two or three occasions before I was ever
in the negotiations. In the Iranians' mind they had contracts with
Iranian court provisions, they were going to stick with those con-
tracts, and that was that. The Algerians thought they had some sort of
understanding with us because we were willing to say that the juris-
diction of the arbitrators over such contracts was an issue for the
tribunal to decide. Nevertheless, we wanted to make it clear in the
text of the agreement that the tribunal was going to decide that issue
on the basis of certain agreed principles. We wanted the agreement to
override the contracts as much as possible. Then we got into a head-
to-head disagreement. They said they wanted the agreement to specif-
ically exclude those contracts from the tribunal's jurisdiction. We said
we wanted the agreement to provide specifically for submission of the
question of the tribunal's jurisdiction over these contracts to the tribu-
nal. So we agreed to drop the provision altogether. The agreement
contained nothing with regard to Iranian court provisions in the
contracts. At the same time, we still had this language on "changed
circumstances" in article V to fall back on, and could make the
argument that Bob Mundheim suggested. 30 When the agreement
was, we thought, completely agreed upon, they took it to the Majlis.
When the Mailis saw the provision regarding arbitration, one of the
opponents of the agreement added the provision which would require
that all disputes committed to the Iranian courts by contract be
witheld from the tribunal. They actually came to us with a proposal
that was even broader than that. It reflected the general proposition
that cases which, under the law of either country, were not subject to
arbitration would be excluded from the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
We would not accept that because we had no idea what it meant.
This was the most difficult issue in connection with the Claims Settle-
30. See Robert Mundheim's statement supra, at 27.
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ment Agreement during the final days. It was the last issue in that
agreement to be resolved, and was done on the basis of the text that
you see. We added some words. A dispute was to be withheld from
the tribunal only in the case of a "binding contract" which specifically
provides for the "sole" jurisdiction of the Iranian courts. "' The Ira-
nians did not want to accept that language. It was obvious that we
were trying to put qualifications on the Majlis resolution. They were
very unhappy about it. Warren Christopher had to make a special trip
to the Foreign Ministry in Algiers where he talked about this with the
Foreign Minister. We just had to have this word "binding." We kept
that word in so that we could make the argument suggested by Bob
Mundheim. I also think that we can use article V to some extent as
support for our interpretation of the Iranian courts provision.
Robert Mundheim: In other words, whether an Iranian courts
provision is "binding" depends upon whether or not changed circum-
stances deprive the clause of its binding quality.
Mark Feldman: The argument that I make is that there is no
judicial remedy available to Americans in Iran today, because, in the
present circumstances, it is not safe and because there is a pervasive
prejudice against everything associated with the "Great Satan." There
are other circumstances concerning the state of their institutions
which might be argued, but that gets a little bit more difficult.
Harold Maier: I just want a clarification. Exactly where do you
stand with regard to Hans Smit's position to the effect that article V
merely tells the tribunal to go forth and do good. That is basically
what he was suggesting. Correct me, Hans, if I am wrong.
Hans Smit: To do what I would do.
Harold Maier: Is that the position of the State Department? Or
are these terms-"choice of law rule" and "principles of commercial
or international law"-intended as terms of art rather than having the
more general meaning that Hans suggests?
Mark Feldman: We would argue that international law has a
content, for example, "full, prompt and effective compensation" 3 2 in
the case of an expropriation. But it depends on your judge.
Harold Maier: You can argue that about all law.
31. Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 1, at art. II, para. 1.
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 187-190 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
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Mark Feldman: Well, particularly in this agreement it is the
mind of the judges, it is what they think. Arbitrators make it up as
they go along and so do we in the State Department.
Michael Silverman: One more point on the interpretation of
"binding," which I know was reflected in the Government's recent
Statement of Interest filed in all the pending court cases. 33  I am
somewhat wary of claimants arguing that these contracts are not
binding insofar as choice of forum clauses are concerned. Such an
argument opens up the possibility that the Iranians will say that if the
contracts are not binding that includes other contract terms, such as
the terms of payment and performance. I wonder what Pandora's box
we are opening by promoting that kind of argument. Also, insofar as I
know, there is no provision in Iranian law which requires going to the
Majlis or any other government body to approve an arbitration. Un-
der the Iranian civil code there is a provision against nominating
non-Iranian arbitrators in advance of a dispute. I never heard of any
other provision requiring the approval of another body.
Mark Feldman: It is in the Constitution of Iran. 14
John Westburg: In the current Constitution?
Mark Feldman: Yes.
John Westburg: It was not in the old Constitution. There is a
lot of background to this problem of arbitration in Iran. There is a
distinction made in Iranian law between an arbitration involving
nongovernmental entities and arbitration on a government contract.
With regard to nongovernmental entities, arbitration is clearly pro-
vided for in the arbitration law of the Civil Practice Act. Many
disputes in Iran have been settled that way. But on government
contracts there has been a series of laws and decrees dating back to
1945. These attempted to limit the authority of government officials
to agree to arbitration. No one has ever been able, so far as I know, to
exhaustively research that question in Iran. No one really knows for
sure which government authorities can agree to arbitration and when
they can do so. When I was there, if there was an important contract
33. Statement of Interest of the United States, filed in New England Merchants
Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Co., Nos. 80-3063, 80-6254, 80-7912, slip op. (2d Cir. Apr.
9, 1981) [hereinafter Statement of Interest] [for text, see infra Appendix at 109]. An
identical statement of interest was filed by the Government in a number of cases
involving Iranian assets.
34. CONST., Chap. VI, art. 77, para. 1 (Iran), reprinted in VII CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTIES OF THE WOaLD, IRAN (A. Blanstein & G. Flantz, eds. 1980).
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with an arbitration clause in it, the common practice was to make
sure that the contracting agency went to the Council of Ministers and
obtained a Council decree. That is what the oil companies did and
that became the practice if you had any doubts. But there never has
been a judicial decision or a legal opinion from the Minister of Justice
or anything else upon which we in the West could safely rely. It was
just practice.
Keith Rosenn: I want to follow up on Michael Silverman's first
point .3 5 I question whether the "changed circumstances" language in
article V can be confined solely to the choice of forum problem. Might
it also not be argued- by Iran that, by inserting the words "and
principles" after "choice of law," article V really gives "changed
circumstances" a substantive law content rather than simply a conflict
of laws content? If so, one can turn around and say that all of the civil
law frustration doctrines, catalogued so neatly by Professor Smit in a
fine article in the Columbia Law Review, 36 which allow obligors to
escape from contracts because of changed circumstances, should be
part of the law which the tribunal should be applying. The "changed
circumstance" language might well backfire on the American claim-
ants. It is clear from the context of the negotiations that "changed
circumstances" was intended to have only a choice of forum refer-
ence?
Mark Feldman: It is clear from the negotiating context who
wants the contracts to be performed.
Michael Silverman: I also want to go back to the word "bind-
ing" and the language at the end of that clause that says, "in response
to the Majlis position."37 Maybe Mark Feldman would comment on
how that came to be included. It raises the possibility, or probability,
that the Iranians will argue that this incorporates by reference the
Majlis decree which contains a very different and broader exclusion
provision than what has been suggested here. Was there some discus-
sion of this during the negotiations?
Mark Feldman: Just as you might expect, it was the very last
thing that was done. The Algerians finally said: "All right, you have
to have this 'binding' language; would you people agree if we put
these words at the end?" We accepted it as cosmetic, and Iran ac-
cepted the clause.
35. Supra, at 30.
36. Smit, Frustration ol Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation, 58
COLUM. L. REv. 287 (1958).
37. Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 1, at art. II, para. 1.
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Michael Reisman: Two points. First of all, I continue to be
very much concerned about articles V and VII and the points Steve
Riesenfeld raised. 38 It is not profitable to discuss them any more but I
continue to think that there is much more of an international con-
sensus, and that it may not always work to our benefit.
I do have another question and it goes back to article 11(1) of the
Claims Settlement Agreement. The New York Times reported, proba-
bly incorrectly, that you [Mark Feldman] had said at a meeting in
New York shortly after the agreement, that you understood the last
section of article 11(1) to mean that a claimant who was excluded from
the arbitral tribunal because of a choice of forum clause in the con-
tract, can continue to sue in the United States. But, if I now under-
stand what you are saying, "changed circumstances" in article V, as
you construe it, means that you still contemplate that such a claimant
will be able to go before the tribunal. Which is your position?
Mark Feldman: The litigation is governed by the first declara-
tion, where we committed ourselves to terminate litigation through
the process of arbitration. 39  On that basis we take the position that if
a case were excluded from the arbitral tribunal, including Iranian
cases (i.e., where the claimant is an Iranian national), for whatever
reason, the claimant can continue to litigate in the U.S. courts. How-
ever, every American claimant has a powerful argument that he has
no forum in Iran, and that he has a forum in the arbitral tribunal.
There is going to be a dynamic process which, we hope, will
develop in the course of the litigation. We hope Iran's attorneys in the
United States will have a mandate to take a position in those cases. If
they say that the claimant cannot go before the arbitral tribunal and if
the claimant prefers to stay in the U.S. courts, we are just going to say
38. Supra, at 39, 43.
39. Algerian Declaration, supra note 1. General Principles, para. B. This para-
graph provides:
B. It is the purpose of both parties, within the framework of and
pursuant to the provisions of the two Declarations of the Government of
the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, to terminate all litiga-
tion as between the Government of each party and the nationals of the
other, and to bring about the settlement and termination of all such claims
through binding arbitration. Through the procedures provided in the
Declaration, relating to the Claims Settlement Agreement, the United
States agrees to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts
involving claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran and
its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments and judgments obtained
therein, to prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and to
bring about the termination of such claims through binding arbitration.
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go ahead in the U.S. courts. If, on the other hand, the claimant wants
to go before the arbitral tribunal, we will suspend the claim until the
tribunal has had a chance to decide the question. That is the way we
hope it will work.
Michael Reisman: Again, if I may add a point as to arbitral
procedure, I know of no case in which the argument that there was no
other available forum swayed an international tribunal to depart
from its general principles and allow a claimant that could not other-
wise prove his right to be there to appear before it. So, unless this
tribunal really does depart from the procedures and practices of other
tribunals, I think it quite unlikely that a claimant will get that ap-
proval.
Mark Feldman: It is a question of whether the contract clause is
impossible of performance. Isn't that a generally accepted notion with
regard to the performance of contracts? I do not know whether there
has ever been a comparable issue before. Do you know of a case in
which an international tribunal ever addressed anything like this?
Michael Reisman: It is common for claimants to say, "If we can't
prove our claim in this arbitral tribunal, we don't have any forum
available to us at all." But that never sways the tribunal, since it views
itself as a creature of limited powers and examines these questions in
terms of its own competence.
Mark Feldman: I am interested in this because it is something
that could occur in these cases. But here the tribunal has jurisdiction
and then it is taken away if there is a "binding" contract specifically
providing "solely" for reference to the Iranian courts. Therefore, the
contract has to be analyzed by the arbitrators.
Alan Swan: The trigger is the "binding."
Soia Mentschikoff: No, I think you are wrong on that. The
trigger isn't the "binding." You have got two things, it has to be a
"binding" contract and it also has to provide that the sole remedy is in
the Iranian courts. The trigger is the "sole remedy" in the Iranian
courts. It is like "sole remedy" for any breach of contract. If the
contract provides a "sole remedy" and that remedy fails-becomes
impossible-then all other remedies open up. That is the argument.
That is the commercial principle of general application. It has noth-
ing to do with international law.
Mark Feldman: That's very helpful, Soia. That was our inten-
tion-our subjective intention. But it is good to have it stated. We had
another purpose. Many of these contracts provide for arbitration with
just general references to Iranian law, or refer to procedures involving
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arbitration with some use of the Iranian courts later on. The word
"sole" was intended to exclude those cases.
Soia Mentschikoff: Well that excludes it in and of itself. It is just
like any other remedy provision. It may provide for "repair and
replacement" but not limit it. In that case I have all the other reme-
dies. Or, I may say "only repair and replacement." That is like "only
the courts of Iran." What you have decided is that when it says "only"
you will go with it. But then you reserve the right to say, "But it fails
of its essential purpose which is to get a remedy, and, therefore, you
can't go with it." That is a fairly solid commercial argument.
Hans Smit: Yes, but we must come back to the language of article
If11]. I did not want to let it pass because, as Soia says, you can attack
the Iranian choice of courts provision on two fronts. You may say it is
a failing contract term, so that once that contract term has failed you
can supply whatever other contract terms are appropriate. The other
approach is to say that it is not a "binding" contract term. I thought
that was the approach that Mark Feldman was advocating. In fact, I
think that if you went into an American court and the defendant said
there is an exclusive forum selection clause selecting Iran, the Ameri-
can courts would say, "Under our conflict of laws rules we will not
hold you bound to that clause in view of the circumstances that
prevail." To that extent, the clause would not be binding on you. If
that is the intention, the formulation was not felicitous.
Mark Feldman: I agree with that.
Hans Smit: It should have been a contract between the parties
"bindingly providing...?" Depending where you put the word "bind-
ing" you can get into Mike Silverman's problem. If he says, "Oh, the
contract is not binding," then the Iranians will say, "All right, it is not
binding."
Mark Feldman: Everybody on the U.S. team was well aware of
that. It was the subject of a twenty-minute conversation at 3:00
o'clock in the morning.
Charles Brower: I wonder if I could take a slightly different
direction. There seems to be a lot of feeling that the law applied is
going to be what the mythical "I" would do in his wisdom and
goodness. If so, it becomes increasingly important to know what sort
of person the "I" is going to be. That, I think, would be educational
for at least some of us to know. We might be able to help out a little
bit on the actual process if we could discuss who is contemplated. Are
the Iranians going to appoint a bunch of Iranian revolutionaries or are
they going to dip into that shallow pool of Swedes and Swiss to whom
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we all turn at such times? What are we going to do? Nobody is limited
to nominating their own nationals. Who do we think the third cate-
gory of people-the neutrals-ought to be? What stature are they
going to have? What are they going to be paid? How much time will
they have to spend on it? I was struck by a conversation I had recently
with someone else that most of the people in my position are looking
only through one end of the telescope, namely, what is going to
happen in court next week? Should we fight this or not? How do we
fight it? And how do we position ourselves each step of the way?
There are others, and that is where the Government should be at the
present time, looking through the other end of the telescope. How is
this arbitral process going to look? That seems to be probably the most
uncertain and, yet, perhaps the most important aspect of the agree-
ment.
Mark Feldman: This is the issue on which we are spending the
most time right now. There are two processes. The first is to get the
claimants officially on notice, to give them the opportunity to submit
their claims and so forth. The other is to move ahead on the arbitra-
tion. We are developing lists of people. We are looking at options in
terms of compensation, which is a big problem for something which is
going to come out of appropriated funds. The consensus of the claim-
ants is that we ought to be using people of distinction; people who
have experience in international business and law; people that will be,
in effect, credible to the claimant community. We agree with all of
that. In view of the number of cases and our uncertainty regarding
the number of arbitral panels we will be able to have, my tentative
thinking is to have a core of people who are practically full-term.
There are lots of volunteers. I am just amazed at how many volunteers
there are; people who are distinguished attorneys, maybe semi-
retired, and lots of professors who have experience and interest in it. We
have one request from the Clerk of the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts, some from sitting judges. There are people who have had
experience as arbitrators, particularly in commercial matters. We
have asked Iran to increase the number of arbitrators from nine to
thirty so that we can have ten panels instead of three. It may be that
we will have a smaller group of permanent panels and then have a
roster with some ad hoc arrangement for other people to come in on
just one or two cases. We are completely flexible on this. We are
working very closely with the ABA committee on Foreign Claims. I
know that Mike Silverman and others are working on the issue and
they are preparing a paper. At the meeting on March 11th I hope to
make some further progress on this. The issue of compensation is a
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much more difficult problem. It is a tradition in the United States not
to provide munificent compensation to civil servants.
Ved Nanda: We did not try to internationalize this conflict as
much as we should or could have done, although we adopted a
textbook kind of approach in managing the conflict. As an interna-
tional lawyer, I was pleased that we went to the United Nations and
to the International Court of Justice. 40 However, we did not pursue
all of the available remedies. We did not seek in every available
international forum for Iran's ouster or suspension from the U.N., or
make an even stronger case involving the international community
versus Iran. Iranian expulsion or suspension from the United Nations
and other international organizations would have had a great psycho-
logical impact upon Iran, no matter how incohesive and unfocused
the Iranian leadership was.
Although only historians can judge what the most desirable
action on the part of the United States would have been, it is clear
that this country lost real opportunities when it failed to transform the
conflict into one between the international community and Iran. By
allowing the focus to remain on the conflict between America and
Iran, rather than on the tension between an outlaw nation and an
outraged international community, the United States did not optimize
the skills of international diplomacy. Imaginative diplomacy is still an
art that the United States can learn from its European partners.
This, however, is not the principal point of our present discus-
sion. With regard to article VII(2) and V, I can see Soia's argument.
But if we consider article V in its relation to the choice of law issues
and international law, especially international commercial law, I do
not think it will work unless we can show that there is absolutely no
remedy in Iran. It will be a very difficult case and should be a cause of
concern. We do not, in fact, know the answer.
Covey Oliver: I have two questions. One is very practical. Do
you foresee that a number of these cases can be settled in a summary
way, maybe even by prearbitral litigation or prearbitral negotiations?
That is one of my questions.
Mark Feldman: The agreement provides a six-month period for
settlement by the parties. This can be extended for three months by
40. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(United States v. Iran),[19791 I.C.J. 7.
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either party.4 1 That language came in from Iran. Iran has always
said that it hopes to settle these cases. The American attorneys for Iran
are in Tehran this week. They went Wednesday afternoon [March 41.
I hope they will return with some concrete authority or instructions
with respect to establishing some of the procedures. As I mentioned
earlier, we are trying to do two things, one is to increase the number
of panels and the other is to make settlements. We have over 2,500
claims. Approximately 1,700 are small claims that would be the re-
sponsibility of the Department of State to present to the arbitral
tribunal. We have proposed to the Iranians, through Algeria, that
they settle those for a lump sum in order to alleviate the tremendous
workload of the tribunal. The amount is peanuts compared to the
billions they are otherwise talking about. Maybe they will go for that;
I don't know.
Soia Mentschikoff: The notion of having permanent arbitrators is
wholly inconsistent with the notion that you are going to have thirty
panels. I do not believe you can. Moreover, you get much better
arbitrators in the commercial area if the panels are ad hoc.
Mark Feldman: I talked about the possibility of ten. I did not
dare suggest thirty. But the prospect of a roster for ad hoc arbitration
has a lot of promise to it. The limitation both for the ad hoc and for
the permanent panels is Iran's shortage of human resources.
Covey Oliver: My other question is a broader one and you may
not want to address it now. Have you, or has anyone, thought about
the old weakness of arbitration when the award is contended to be
ultra vires the compromis? Are we really finally willing to accept
"finality" as to jurisdiction? After all, we do have in our diplomatic
history an unfortunate precedent: an arbitration that was supposed to
be final-as most of them are supposed to be-but which we refused
to accept because we said that the arbitral body went beyond the
jurisdiction established in the compromis.42 That is the question that I
am raising. Is the Claims Settlement Agreement an arbitral compro-
41. Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 1, at art. I, provides:
Iran and the United States will promote the settlement of claims
described in Article II by the parties directly concerned. Any such claims
not settled within six months from the date of entry into force of this
agreement shall be submitted to binding third-party arbitration in accord-
ance with the terms of the agreement. The aforementioned six months'
period may be extended once by three months at the request of either
party.
42. Chamizal Tract Arbitration (United States v. Mexico), [1911] For. Rel. U.S.
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mis? It seems to me that it is. Also it is cast very broadly and that, I
think, would make it very difficult for us in international political,
not legal, terms to disavow a "final award" of the tribunal.
Mark Feldman: I can only speak for myself. I have been moti-
vated from the beginning by one overriding preoccupation-that the
Iranians may not cooperate. There are so many cases, and I have
wanted to insure that the process goes forward with as little participa-
tion by them as necessary. So we have gone for automatism, maxi-
mum power in the tribunal, and finality, and we are continuing to
pursue that policy. We are at a stage which raises a very complicated
question concerning the law applicable to the proceeding. I'm willing
to hear different views. The question is how the arbitral arrangement
relates to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Arbitral Awards. 43 It is a subtle and difficult thing. We are
struggling with it right now. In this connection, we have gone out of
our way to give the tribunal the authority necessary to make its
awards final. One of the things we will have to try and decide is how
to keep the courts of the Netherlands or of England out of these cases.
That is our desire.
Covey Oliver: Final as to its own competence; that is what we
are talking about.
Mark Feldman: We do not want any review at all.
Soia Mentschikoff: You can't keep the English courts out; really,
I'm serious.
Mark Feldman: They have a new statute, 44 Soia.
Soia Mentschikoff: Nobody can keep them out unless they them-
selves agree to be kept out.
Mark Feldman: I want to hear more about that because various
attorneys who are pushing London-there is a lot of pressure to go
London-say that an exclusion clause is all you need even though the
statute appears to authorize appeals "with the leave of the tribunal."
I'm very interested in that.
Soia Mentschikofj: If you look at what the English courts have
consistently done, you should have something more than just an exclu-
sion clause in the arbitral agreement.
43. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
44. Arbitration Act, 1979, c. 42.
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Mark Feldman: Well the point is worth discussing. I am told that
you cannot get away from natural justice-from certain fundamental
concerns-for example, if an arbitrator has a conflict of interest.
Soia Mentschikoff: That is international arbitration. There is
always the concept that courts will inquire into whether there has
been bias or fraud in the proceedings. You are not going to get rid of
that. That, in turn, can open a Pandora's box if properly argued.
There is no way, Covey, of getting finality by action of the arbitra-
tors.
Covey Oliver: I didn't think so. That is why I asked the question.
Mark Feldman: But there are different gradations of finality. In
England they used to have the "stated case" rule and now that is out.
Soia Mentschikoff: That's out, I know. But that does not elimi-
nate the problem. What you really need is an agreement with all the
countries that may become involved as to what will happen to the
awards.
Tone Grant: I have a question for Mark. A number of practical
problems and issues regarding implementation of the agreements have
surfaced, questions regarding settlement of claims and establishment
of the arbitral tribunal. I am curious to have your assessment of not
only the willingness, but the responsiveness and capacity, of the Ira-
nians to recognize the issues and to work toward resolving those
problems.
Mark Feldman: It remains to be demonstrated. We will know
much more about that next week.
Gillis Wetter: I have two questions. First, do any of the underly-
ing contracts between the claimants and the government of Iran
provide for international arbitration? If so, what is the effect of the
Claims Settlement Agreement in relation to that alternative route? My
other question goes to the question of finality. Has an effort been
made to secure finality contractually in regard to the escrow fund? I
have not been able to find what provisions operate in regard to the
escrow.
Mark Feldman: We certainly have every intention of getting
finality. I hope we will do it this month. If we do not, we will still be
looking for a bank to hold what we call the security account. There is
going to have to be a new agreement worked out in that connection.
The Federal Reserve Bank and the Treasury and State Departments
are involved in working up a draft of that agreement. Basically, the
concept is that the bank will pay out on the certification of the
president of the tribunal.
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Gillis Wetter: No matter what?
Mark Feldman: No matter what.
Hans Smit: All of these negotiations are still indirect?
Mark Feldman: Up to now that negotiation is primarily between
the Federal Reserve Bank and the Central Bank of Algeria.
Hans Smit: No one from Bank Markazi?
Mark Feldman: Bob, do you know if Bank Markazi is involved at
all?
Robert Mundheim: Their lawyers are.
Hans Smit: I asked the question because one of the purposes of
the Agreements is to put the past behind us and turn a new leaf. Yet
even now we are still negotiating in large measure indirectly through
the Algerians.
Mark Feldman: Exclusively through the Algerians and through
Iran's attorneys. It is the beginning of a very informal negotiation. I
have just accepted an invitation for a meeting in April; an Iranian
official has also allegedly accepted the invitation.
Cynthia Lichtenstein: Two questions. One, you just said you
were looking for a bank to hold the escrow account, and that that
bank will be able to pay out upon the certification of the president of
the tribunal, no matter what. Can you do that unless you proceed to
put it in some kind of offshore banking center, such as the Bahamas,
that is willing to promise that their courts will not issue attachments
against the escrow agent? Won't you need to have the agreement of
the government of the jurisdiction in which the bank that is acting as
escrow agent is located, to the effect that it will not allow its courts to
issue any kind of order blocking payment out of the escrow?
Mark Feldman: It's a good question. Maybe we ought to do that.
Robert Mundheim: Could you get a government to give that
agreement?
Mark Feldman: Let me just say that the location with which we
are now negotiating permits practically no attachments of foreign
government property. But the other question is: "Whose asset is this?"
Robert Mundheim: That seems to be the interesting question. If
the assets in the escrow account are more than necessary to meet Iran's
obligations, the residual belongs to Iran. How do you know now how
much that is? Is any payment order to a claimant immediately freed
of attachment?
John Westburg: I missed the answer to Gillis Wetter's first ques-
tion concerning the effect of arbitration clauses in the underlying
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contracts. Do they continue to exist? Are they superseded by the
Claims Settlement Agreement? I think you answered it a minute ago,
but I didn't hear the answer.
Mark Feldman: We haven't discussed that issue. We have, how-
ever, discouraged claimants from believing that they could continue
to pursue other remedies than the remedy agreed to. But I do not
think we really have come down on the issue.
Charles Brower: The Statement of Interest 45 filed by the Govern-
ment on February 26 has, I believe, a paragraph addressed to that. In
referring to the exclusion clause relating to the granting of a judicial
remedy, it says that where you have a clause providing for arbitration
of some other type, or in general, you may go before the tribunal.
Mark Feldman: But that is not the question. You may go before
the tribunal. The question is whether you can go elsewhere.
John Westburg: What if you preferred to go to an ad hoc interna-
tional arbitration rather than to the arbitral tribunal established un-
der this agreement? You might ask, "Why would anyone want to do
that since they've got such a marvelous remedy here?" But there are
some people who are not quite convinced.
Mark Feldman: May I make one observation since we may go on
from arbitration to something else this afternoon? We were so con-
cerned about Iranian cooperation, or rather lack of cooperation, in
this agreement that we provided for the arbitral tribunal to actually
alter the rules of procedure if necessary to produce a result. 4 ' The
purpose was to insure that this agreement would be carried out. What
we really would have wanted to say is that the tribunal can alter the
agreement if necessary. We were actually thinking about the possibil-
ity of going for a default judgment en masse. We were looking for
some way of expediting the process if Iran absolutely refused to coop-
erate.
Stefan Riesenfeld: I only want to make one remark concerning
John Westburg's question. If you could go to another tribunal, isn't
there also a question of what that might do to the impossibility of
abiding by a choice of forum clause?
45. Statement of Interest, supra note 33.
46. Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 1, art. VI, para. 4 provides: "'Any
question concerning the interpretation or application of this agreement shall be
decided by the Tribunal upon request of either Iran or the United States."
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Michael Reisman: This goes to an issue that Covey raised a little
earlier 47 about the possibility of the nullification of claims because of
an exces de pouvoir on the part of the tribunal. It is a pervasive
problem-much more common in our history than the single case of
the Chamizal Arbitration. However, I do not think that it is a real
problem in this case because the debtor state has already anted up. It
is a problem only in those circumstances in which we have an arbitral
award but the debtor does not want to pay. You pursue him and he
claims that there's been an exces de pouvoir.
Alan Swan: But what happens if the American claimant loses
before the arbitral tribunal, commences his lawsuit in the United
States, and the arbitrator's decision is then pleaded as a defense?
Frank Mayer: Or what happens if the Iranians do not replenish
the billion-dollar security account?
Hans Smit: Or what happens if the Iranians seek an injunction
against the escrow agent?
Covey Oliver: Suppose the Iranians do not appoint anybody?
That is an old ploy we have faced before.
Michael Silverman: One last last point on this matter of another
forum. I take it that the position in the regulations48 is that American
claimants who are capable of securing jurisdiction over Iran in foreign
courts are not free to do so; that American claimants cannot now
bring suit in foreign courts. That certainly seems to be the effect of the
regulations.
Mark Feldman: In the regulations we have not done anything to
touch suits in foreign courts. That is entirely between the parties and
the foreign court.
Cynthia Lichtenstein: I would like to ask if there was any history
as to the meaning of the word "debts" in article 11. 4 This goes back
to the point that if you say the contracts are not binding-that the
contracts themselves are considered to be rescinded or possibly are
unenforceable because of frustration or whatever-can the claimant
say, "My restitutionary right is a debt," and still claim? Under article
II does the word "debt" imply the right to restitution for benefits
conferred?
47. Supra at 63.
48. Iranian Asset Control Regulations, supra note 11.
49. Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 1.
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Mark Feldman: We're all lawyers. You can make that argument.
Certainly the arbitral tribunal can, as I understand it, remedy unjust
enrichment even if it does not award expectation damages in the
particular circumstances. I am not aware, however, of any circum-
stance in Iran that would justify a tribunal in withholding expectation
damages. Just because there is a change of government and it does not
like certain people, that is not a reason for breaching a contract. That
is not the same thing as saying the claimant cannot go and litigate in
Iran because he is afraid for his life or liberty.
Covey Oliver: Is it all right to ask a few more textual questions?
If so, is there anything in the negotiating history regarding the next
phrase in article II of the Claims Settlement Agreement which reads:
"arising out of debts, contracts . . ., expropriations or other measures
affecting property rights, excluding claims described in paragraph 11
of the Declaration?""0 Cynthia Lichtenstein's question prompted my
inquiry.
Mark Feldman: In shorthand the reference to paragraph 11 re-
fers to the hostage claims.
Michael Silverman: And claims arising out of "popular revolu-
tionary movements." 5'
Mark Feldman: I saw a complaint in a hostage case just yester-
day of which I had not been aware. I think it shows what the Iranians
had in mind in terms of "popular revolutionary movements." This
was a complaint with respect to an incident that took place in Febru-
50. Id.
51. The term is found in the Algerian Declaration, supra note 1, at para. 11,
which provides:
11. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certifica-
tion described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States will promptly
withdraw all claims now pending against Iran before the International
Court of Justice and will thereafter bar and preclude the prosecution
against Iran of any pending or future claim of the United States or a
United States national arising out of events occurring before the date of
this declaration related to (A) the seizure of the 52 United States nationals
on November 4, 1979, (B) their subsequent detention, (C) injury to United
States property or property of the United States nationals within the
United States Embassy compound in Tehran after November 3, 1979, and
(D) injury to the United States nationals or their property as a result of
popular movements in the course of the Islamic Revolution of Iran which
were not an act of the Government of Iran. The United States will also bar
and preclude the prosecution against Iran in the courts of the United States
of any pending or future claim asserted by persons other than the United
States nationals arising out of the events specified in the preceding sen-
tence.
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ary 1979. There was a brief embassy takeover in February, property
was damaged, the people were hassled, and so forth, and they have
just filed suit for those damages.
Michael Silverman: Regarding this reference to "popular revolu-
tionary movements," to your knowledge, Mark, was there any discus-
sion with the Iranians of things like workers' committee takeovers of
factories and offices, arrests of management by workers, and that type
of thing, which arguably could be a partial "taking"-namely, the
loss of control by management? Did the Iranians express the view that
such action would be considered part of a "popular revolutionary
movement" not sanctioned by the Government? I know that the new
regulations try to address that and give some comfort to claimants,
but was that also part of the negotiations?
Mark Feldman: There was no discussion of that.
Covey Oliver: The point this discussion makes for me is that if the
exclusion in article II, which I read out, is a one minus one equals zero
situation-put in by article II of the Claims Settlement Agreement
and then taken out by paragraph 11 of the Algerian Declaration-
that is one thing. If, however, it is something in addition to what is
covered by the exclusion in paragraph 11, then there will be a prob-
lem of interpretation by somebody as between the Algerian Declara-
tion and the Claim Settlement Agreement. I suppose that will fall to
the tribunal too.
Mark Feldman: We tried to avoid rephrasing or recharacterizing
those claims and just referred to the paragraphs in the Declaration.
Covey Oliver: This is only a reference to what is excluded? There
is no surplusage? The statement is not one minus something equals a
residue? It is one minus one equals zero?
Mark Feldman: If we succeeded that's what we intended.
Frank Mayer: Were any of these declarations and undertakings
on the governmental level executed or issued in more than one lan-
guage?
Mark Feldman: Unlike other negotiations, these were agreed
upon in separate rooms, in separate languages and were never com-
pared.
Frank Mayer: So one of the issues before the tribunal is certainly
going to be the interpretation of linguistic disputes.
Mark Feldman: Conceivably, even likely.
SETTLEMENT WITH IRAN
Robert Mundheim: The French/English provision in paragraph 9
of the Escrow Agreement52 brings back an amusing memory to me. In
the negotiations, the Algerians tabled a French version; we tabled an
English version. The problem was that the American delegation was
not really expert in French. The Algerians, however, spoke English a
little better than we spoke French, so ultimately we started to work
off the English language version. They said all along that there must
be a French and an English version and that they were to be of equal
weight. Well, it got around to the end and we said, "Who's going to
do the French version?" They said, "You are." We said, "We don't
have any facility for doing it." So, what we concocted was the clause
which says that sometime in the future the French language version
will be done and then it will have equal status with the English
version. As far as I know, Mark, there is no French language version
yet.
Mark Feldman: I don't know of any.
Alan Swan: What structure are you thinking about for the arbi-
tral tribunal? These interpretive problems are all large questions
which cut across lots of cases. Yet, on some of the same basic ques-
tions, individual cases will present unique circumstances. Are you
thinking of some mechanism within the tribunal-a review procedure
or a group-that will control so that there is some uniformity in the
resolution of these issues?
Mark Feldman: We hope that the president of the tribunal will
do that. In our more elaborate draft we provided for all kinds of
review procedures, very elaborate structures and so forth. We have
here a situation where the president can appoint panels. .5 It is really
within his discretion. We need a very strong president for this tribu-
nal. If any of you have any ideas on that subject, I'd be very glad to
52. Escrow Agreement, supra note 1, para. 9, states: "A French language version
of this Agreement will be prepared as soon as practicable. The English and French
versions will be equally authentic and of equal value."
53. Claims Settlement Agreement, supra, note 1, art. 111, para. I, provides:
The Tribunal shall consist of nine members or such larger multiple of
three as Iran and the United States may agree are necessary to conduct its
business expeditiously. Within 90 days after the entry into force of this
agreement, each Government shall appoint one-third of the members.
Within 30 days after their appointment, the members so appointed shall
by mutual agreement select the remaining third of the Tribunal. Claims
may be decided by the full Tribunal or by a panel of three members of the
Tribunal as the President shall determine. Each such panel shall be com-
posed by the President and shall consist of one member appointed by each
of the three methods set forth above.
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have them. It is going to have to be somebody who has sufficient
credibility with the Third World to be acceptable. But it should be
somebody who is fundamentally schooled in the Western system of
law and rooted in the concepts of property rights and human rights.
Charles Brower: I gather that consideration is being given to
London as an alternative seat for the arbitration. Why is it being
considered, are there any others, and why?
Mark Feldman: There are a great many anglophiles among the
claimants' bar in Washington who feel that they want the amenities of
London. Some of them even told me that we could not run something
like this out of The Hague. I said I didn't believe that.
Charles Brower: They've probably been to The Hague.
Mark Feldman: There is enough work to spread all around Eu-
rope as far as I can see.
VALIDITY OF THE SETTLEMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Alan Swan: I think we should begin this afternoon to work a
little bit on the question of the validity of the agreements under
international law. Later, we will pick up questions regarding the
statutory authorities that underlie the executive actions in this case.
So, to get us started on the issue of the international legal validity of
the agreement-the effect of that question on the jurisdiction of the
arbitrators and on court actions-I'm going to ask Hans Smit if he
would open up with some remarks.
Hans Smit: When I saw the terms of the settlement with Iran for
the first time, I followed what I have already told you is my natural
inclination, and that is to test its validity under the Hans Smit concep-
tion of justice. I came to the conclusion that an agreement of that
nature had to be void or voidable under international law. Having
reached that conclusion, I went to the authorities to see whether I
could find someone to back up the accuracy of that statement. I
looked at the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties54 and found
some articles that bore upon it. One of them, article 52,5- said that a
54. U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 39/27 and Corrigenda. May 23, 1969 [for text, see infra
Appendix at 184].
55. Id. This article states:
Coercion of a state by the threat or use of force
A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use
of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the
Charter of the United Nations.
